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Leon Blum..
Leon
Blum was born in Paris, France, on 9th April, 1872. The son of Jewish
parents, he studied law at the Sorbonne where he was converted to socialism.
After leaving university
Blum worked for Jean Jaures. Rejected for
military service by the French Army in
the First World War, he entered the Chamber of
Deputies in 1919. Blum became leader of the Socialist
Party and in 1924 supported the government of Edouard
Herriot.
Concerned by the
emergence of Adolf Hitler in Nazi
Germany, a group of left-wing politicians, led by Blum, Edouard
Daladier, Maurice
Thorez, Edouard
Herriot, Daniel
Mayer formed the Popular
Front in November 1935. Parties involved in the agreement
included the Communist Party, the Socialist
Party and the Radical Party.
The parties involved
in the Popular Front
did well in the May 1936 parliamentary elections and won a total of
376 seats. Blum, leader of the Socialist
Party, now become prime minister of France.
Blum therefore became the first Jew in France history to hold this post.
Once in power the
Popular Front
government introduced the 40 hour week and other social reforms. It
also nationalized the Bank of France and the armaments industry.
In July, 1936, José
Giral, the prime minister of the Popular
Front government in Spain, requested aid against the military uprising
led by Emilio Mola, Francisco
Franco and
José Sanjurjo. Blum agreed to send
aircraft and artillery. However, after coming under pressure from Stanley
Baldwin and
Anthony
Eden
in Britain,
and more right-wing members of his own cabinet, he changed his mind.
Blum now called for all countries in Europe not to intervene in the
Spanish Civil War.
The Communist
Party, that up to then had supported the Popular
Front government, now organized large demonstrations against
Blum's policy of non-intervention. With the left-wing in open revolt
against the government and a growing economic crisis, Blum decided to
resign on 22nd June.
Once in opposition
Blum campaigned for France
to end its nonintervention policy. On 13th March 1938 Blum returned
to power as prime minister. He immediately reopened the frontier with
Spain to allow vast amounts of military equipment
to enter the country. Blum now came under considerable pressure from
the right-wing press and political figures such as Henri-Philippe
Petain and
Maurice Gamelin. On 10th April 1938, Blum's
government fell and he was replaced by Edouard
Daladier as prime minister.
When
the German Army invaded France in May 1940,
Blum escaped to southern France but Henri-Philippe
Petain ordered his arrest. Along with Edouard
Daladier and Paul Reynaud he was tried
in February, 1942, for betraying his country. He was handed over to
the Germans who held him prisoner until 1945. Leon Blum died on 30th
March, 1950.
Leon
Blum: World at War
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Blum: Wikipedia
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Blum: Spartacus
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Debates
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Military
Commanders and the First World War
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Leon
Blum
(1)
Leon Blum, speech in the House of Representatives
(6th December 1936)
Our foreign policy has been inspired by two simple principles: the
determination to place France's interests above all others, and the
conviction that France has no greater interest than that of peace, the
certainty that peace for France is inseparable from peace for Europe.
All the groups in the majority, and I am sure the whole House, are in
agreement on these principles.
I shall not accuse
anyone of trying to push us directly or indirectly toward war. Everyone
in France wants peace. Everyone is equally ardent in expressing this
wish, and I have no doubt, equally sincere. Everyone understands that
neither war, nor consequently peace, can today be contained within national
borders, and that a people can only preserve itself from the scourge
by contributing to preserve all others from it.
However, gentlemen,
despite this fundamental agreement, I am obliged to remark that our
questioners have been rather discreet in praising us. Most of the opposition
speakers, and first and foremost my friend Paul Reynaud, have come forward
in turn to claim that because of the composition of the majority and
the demands of our domestic program we are condemned, in the international
sphere, either to self-contradiction or to impotence. And furthermore,
on what may be the gravest of current issues - it is certainly the most
emotional - the Spanish question, our common desire for peace nonetheless
leaves us in disagreement, in practice, with one of the groups of the
majority, the group made up by the Communist party.
I have dealt with
this question elsewhere. I have never spoken of it before the House.
Although, in reality, I have nothing to add to the declarations of my
friend Mr. Yvon Delbos (Radical-Socialist Party), with whom I have always
shared the most loyal and affectionate sense of solidarity, the House
will no doubt permit me to furnish some personal explanations. I repeat,
as was said by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that as far as we are
concerned, there is only one legal government in Spain, or, to put it
better, only one government. The principles of what might be called
democratic law coincide in this respect with the undisputed rules of
international law.
I recognize that
France's direct interest includes and calls for the presence of a friendly
government on Spanish soil, and one that is free of certain other European
influences. I have no hesitation in agreeing that the establishment
in Spain of a military dictatorship too closely bound by links of indebtedness
to Germany and Italy would represent not only an attack on the cause
of international democracy, but a source of anxiety - I do not wish
to put it more strongly - for French security, and hence a threat to
peace. In that respect, I agree with the argument that Mr. Gabriel Peri
(Communist Party) presented to the House. In fact, I deplore that such
an obvious truth was not perceived from the start by all of French and
international public opinion, and that it has been obscured by Party
passion and resentment. Let me add - and I do not think that anyone
in this House will pay me the insult of being surprised - that I do
not intend for a single moment to deny the personal friendship tying
me to the Spanish socialists, and to many republicans: it still attaches
me to them, despite the bitter disappointment they feel and express
about me today.
I know all that.
I feel it all. And to take this sort of public confession through to
its conclusion, I shall add that since 8 August, a certain number of
our hopes and expectations have in fact been disappointed; that all
of us were hoping that the noninterference pact, which we had put into
effect in advance, would be signed more promptly; that we were counting
on the other governments' keeping more closely to their commitments.
The policy of noninterference, in many respects, has not produced all
we expected of it. True. But, gentlemen, is that a reason to condemn
it? Here we must, all of us, make a very thorough analysis.
If it is true that
in the name of international freedom, and in the name of French security,
we must at all costs prevent the rebellion on Spanish soil from succeeding,
then I declare that the conclusions reached by Mr. Gabriel Peri and
Mr. Thorez (Communist Party)do not go far enough. It is not enough to
denounce the noninterference agreement. It is not enough to reestablish
free arms trade between France
and Spain. Free arms trade between France and Spain would not be adequate
aid, far from it. No! To assure the success of Republican legality in
Spain, we would have to go further, much further. We would have to take
a much greater step.
In conditions such
as we have them at present, the truth of the matter is - and events
have proved it - that the arming of a government can really only be
done by another government. To be really effective, aid must be governmental.
This is true from the point of view of materials, and from the point
of view of recruitment. It would have to include, by way of equipment,
levying arms from our own stocks, and byway of a sign-up of volunteers,
levying troops from our units.
(2)
A member of the Labour Party, Emanuel
Shinwell initially argued that the
British government should give support to the Republicans in the Spanish
Civil War. He wrote about his views in his autobiography, Conflict
Without Malice (1955)
When the Spanish Republican Government was formed in 1936 the
news was received enthusiastically by Socialists in Britain. Many of
the new Government members were well known in the international Socialist
movement. The emergence of a democratic regime in Spain was a bright
light in a gloomy period when war had raped Abyssinia, and Germany had
repudiated the Locarno Treaty. On the sudden outbreak of civil war in
July, 1936, Socialist movements in all those European countries where
they were allowed to exist immediately took steps to consider whether
intervention should be demanded.
The Fascist attack
was regarded as aggression by the majority of thinking people. Leon
Blum, at the time Prime Minister of France, was greatly concerned in
this matter. As political head of a nation which was bordered by Spain
he had to consider the danger of some of the belligerents being forced
over the border; as a Socialist he had a duty to go to the help of his
comrades, members of a legally elected Government, who had been attacked
by men organized and financed from outside Spanish home territory.
In Britain, although
the Government was against intervention, the Labour Party had to face
the strong demands from the rank-and-file for concrete action. The three
executives met at Transport House to consider the next move, and I was
present as a member of the Parliamentary Executive. We were largely
influenced by Blum's policy. He had decided that he could not risk committing
his country to intervention. Germany and Italy were supplying arms,
aircraft, and men to the Spanish Fascists, and Blum considered that
any action on the Franco Spanish border on behalf of the Republican
Government would bring imminent danger of retaliatory moves by Fascist
Italy and Nazi Germany on France's eastern flank. As a result of this
French attitude Herbert Morrison's appeal in favour of intervention
received little support. Although, like him, I was inclined towards
action I pointed out that if France failed to intervene it would be
a futile gesture to advise that Britain should do so. We had the recent
farce of sanctions against Italy as a warning.
(3)
Leon Blum, speech (July 1941)
When Hitler and Goebbels talk of organising Europe, when the
French 'collaborators' echo their words, we know what they mean and
what they want. In present realities their European Order is nothing
but the utilisation of all European resources, the extraction and extortion
of all we have, for the benefit of the Axis, and their so-called organisation
of Europe is no more than the future total enslavement of Europe by
the Nazi regime. Thus the same words are used with diametrically opposed
meanings. When we talk of a European Order, we are thinking not of war
but of peace; when we talk of European organisation, we are thinking
not of a common subjection to the domination of a tyrant, but of the
federation of free and equal nations, of a League of Nations! Let us
not be afraid to admit that the ideal of 1919 was a fine one. It is
cheap and easy today to mock at the League, but if we have the courage
to ignore the mockery, we must agree that we shall yet have to return
to the same inspiration.
As it was conceived
at the end of the last war by all the great democrats of both hemispheres,
the League of Nations was a noble and magnificent creation. I believe
this to be true despite its failure, which I do not seek in any way
to minimise or excuse. I remain convinced, despite its failure, that
it would still be sufficient and able to impose respect for international
order among those political societies that gave it birth. Its failure,
moreover, was something from which the world will have to learn its
lesson. The League of Nations, created by the Treaties of Versailles,
failed because great powers like Russia and the United States, whose
support was essential, were outside it from the start. It failed because
its founders, trying to disarm suspicions here and fears there, did
not dare give it the instruments and the living strength that it needed
to function properly. It failed because it was not itself a great sovereign
power, distinct from national sovereign powers and greater than they;
because it had neither the political authority nor the material force
to enable it to carry out its decisions and impose its will on national
states; because its powers were too restricted and too intermittent
to allow it to cover the same fields of activity as national sovereign
states.
It would be easy
to quote arguments and facts in support of each of these reasons. If
we take the antithesis of each of them, we shall have outlined the principles
which must be applied this time in order to have a living and effective
international organisation. All the powers, and particularly America
and Russia, must be parties to the new covenant.
The international
body must have the institutions and powers it needs to do what it is
created to do; in other words it must be boldly and openly set up as
a super-state on a level above the national sovereignties, and that,
in turn, means that the Member States must have accepted in advance
as much limitation and subordination of their particular sovereignties
as this superior sovereign power requires.